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 Purpose: The purpose of this paper will focus on monitoring and improving 
corporate governance through earnings quality. In particular, audit 
committee effectiveness is seen as a significant factor in ensuring effective 
corporate governance and in view of this, the aim of this paper is to develop 
a conceptual framework that will examine the impact expertise, meeting and 
meeting attendance on the earnings quality of companies. 
Methodology:Future empirical studies could be conducted quantitatively 
with secondary data. The report from annual reports of companies listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) starting from the period of implementation 
of the new code on implementation guideline in 2013. 
Implication: In fact, the main issue was centered on financial reporting 
manipulations and there is need to examine and develop a mechanism that 
in addition, agency theory is expected to explain the above three factors in 
providing explanation to accounting information that relates to the earnings 
quality under study. Finally, it is expected that future empirical studies with 
this conceptual framework can enhance earnings quality for users of 
financial statements such as: investors, creditors, shareholders and other 
stakeholders in Indonesia and beyond. 
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1. Introduction  
The prolonged economic crisis in Asia which began from 1998 until early 2000 and the bankruptcy issues 
with big corporations in the US such as WorldCom, Tyco, Toshiba Corp, Enron, Lucent, and Xerox 
negatively affects the quality of earnings in companies. As such, financial scandals in financial statements 
distort the quality of financial reporting and by extension; such scandals affect the decision-making 
capabilities of stakeholders, especially in terms of being imprecise with decision-making processes 
(Chang & Sun, 2010; Lau, 2014). According to Schipper and Vincent (2003), low earnings quality is 
capable of causing miscalculation of capital and other related resources by investors, and other users of 







Low earnings quality is a function of low performance of organizations which negatively affects investor 
confidence in the financial reporting of organizations (Luchs et al., 2009). Similarly, low earnings quality 
is a result of lack of transparency of financial reporting occasioned by weak laws and related legislations 
to protect investors as well as non-application of extant corporate governance principles and mechanisms 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Donaggio, 2014; Fan & Wong, 2002). On the other hand, good corporate 
governance helps in reducing agency costs by aligning the interests of owners and management (Jensen 
&Meckling, 1976). 
 
Asian countries are experiencing weak corporate governance and Indonesia is one of such countries 
(Asian Corporate Governance Association, 2014). This is because; Indonesia was reported to have low 
earnings quality as it was ranked as the 35
th
 out of 48 countries in the world (Milken Institute, 2009). 
Therefore, to improve the investment climates, it is pertinent to provide better protection for investors. 
One of such ways of protecting investors is by strengthening internal governance mechanisms. 
Additionally, based on the provisions of the agency theory, effectiveness of the audit committee will 
improve earnings quality and reduce agency problem (Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Saenz Gonzales & Garcia-
Meca, 2014).  
 
In order to strengthen the audit committee functions, companies are required to report the percentage of 
meeting attendance of the audit committee member in the audit committee's performance report 
(BAPEPAM-LK, 2012). Also, attendance to audit committee meetings is important to its effectiveness in 
the financial reporting of organizations (Rickling, 2014). Audit committee members with expertise in 
accounting knowledge can facilitate the committee in monitoring the financial reporting process more 
effective (Sun et al., 2014). Particularly, audit committee is tasked to supervise the financial reporting 
process and as such, members with accounting and finance background meet more often to meeting issues 
of financial reporting so that it can withstand the practice of earnings management (Baxter & Cotter, 
2009). In a nutshell, effectiveness of audit committee can ensure financial reporting that is free of 
misstatement, resulting in reduce information asymmetry and enhanced earnings quality, and the building 
of better investors’ confidence. 
 
2. Earnings Quality and Internal Monitoring of Corporate Governance 
Earnings quality of corporations cannot be separated from the agency conflict. When owner (principal) 
delegates decision-making authority to management (agent), it could have broader information than the 
owner (information asymmetry). Earnings quality is a very important factor for users of financial 
information such as investors, financial analysts, creditors, regulators and academics (Ghajara&Saeidi, 
2016; Nelson & Skinner, 2013). According to Dechow et al. (2010) earnings quality is aimed at providing 
information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision 
made by a specific decision-maker. Earnings quality information is expected to be relied upon in making 
investment decisions and in making the markets more efficient (Schipper&Vincent, 2003; Wang et al., 
2009). Therefore, to improve earnings quality, monitoring the financial reporting process to avoid 
financial scandals is of paramount importance (Chang & Sun, 2010). 
 
Earnings quality is critical to the financial reporting system. In improving the transparency of financial 
reporting, some efforts should be put in place. The efforts are amongst others: changes in accounting 
standards, corporate governance and external audit. More so, increases in financial transparency will 
greatly impact on the increase in earnings quality (Ewert&Wagenhofer, 2013). Furthermore, earnings 
quality was found to be useful and relevant information for shareholders in predicting share return. Hence, 
earnings and future returns are expected to be related, and has been supported by some empirical 
underpinnings (Martínez‐Ferrero et al., 2015). Thus, investors perceived that companies with high 
earnings quality are more transparent (Alves, 2014). 





Internal monitoring of corporate governance reduces the asymmetry of information between the 
management and the shareholders. However, this is a responsibility of the audit committee (Baxter & 
Cotter, 2009; Rusmin, 2011). Agency theory is the basis of corporate governance through internal and 
external mechanisms (Roberts et al., 2005; Weir et al, 2002). With perspectives of agency theory, 
effectiveness of the audit committee can increase monitoring to protect the interests of shareholders and 
reduce agency cost and increase earnings quality (Adiguzel, 2013; Azzoz&Khamees, 2016; McKnight & 
Weir, 2009).  
 
Audit committee is a monitoring unit in corporate governance and the main purpose of its existence is to 
protect the interests of shareholders and to perform its responsibilities in monitoring internal control, and 
financial disclosure accordingly (Turley & Zaman, 2004). The provisions of the agency theory posit that 
the characteristics of the audit committee involves monitoring of the financial reporting standards of the 
organization to enhance effectiveness and thereby reduce asymmetric information and agency cost 
(Ika&Ghazali, 2012; Qi & Tian, 2012). The characteristics of audit committee include expertise, meeting, 
and meeting attendance (Bala& Kumai, 2015; Musa et al., 2017; Sharma &Kuang, 2014). 
 
Accounting and finance expertise of audit committee members is critical to their effectiveness.Audit 
committee members with expertise in accounting knowledge can facilitate the committee in monitoring 
the financial reporting process more effectively (Sun et al., 2014).  Similarly, audit committee meeting 
and meeting attendance are important to its effectiveness in the financial reporting of organizations 
(Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Musa et al., 2017;Saleh et al., 2007; Yusof, 2010).Audit committee meeting and 
meeting attendance of members can make the audit committee to be more effective in monitoring the 
management in suppressing earnings management practice, reduce earnings manipulation (Musa et al., 
2017) and reduce agency problem and thus, improving earnings quality (Jensen &Meckling, 1976).    
 
 
3. The Conceptual Framework and hypothesis Development 
The conceptual framework of this study is developed to study the relationship of audit committee 
effectiveness with earnings quality. In this proposed framework, effectiveness of auditcommittee such as 
meeting, expertise and meeting attendance are the independent variables and earnings quality is the 
dependent variable. To emphasize, the present study tries to bridge the gap by giving a basis for a 
thorough and insightful investigation on the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
earnings quality. Figure 1 illustrates the link between effectiveness of the audit committee with earnings 
quality. 
 

















 Meeting Attendance 
 
Earnings Quality 





3.1 Audit Committee Meeting and Earnings Quality 
Audit committee meeting is important in conducting effective oversight functions in monitoring the 
performance of managers (Bala& Kumai, 2016; Soliman&Ragab, 2014). Beasley (1996) suggested that 
audit committee meetings should at least be conducted once to review the interim report. This is because, 
high frequency of audit committee meeting tend to reduce financial problem (Menon & Williams, 1994). 
Also, based on agency theory perspective, the results of previous studies have shown that frequency of 
audit committee meeting can improve earnings quality (Bamahros&Wan-Hussin, 2011; Garcia et al., 
2010; Yusof, 2010). Furthermore, several empirical studies have tested the relationship between the 
frequency of audit committee meeting and earnings quality and found positive significant results 
(Salleh&Haat, 2014; Soliman&Ragab, 2014; Garcia et al., 2010; Yusof, 2010). In contrast, other 
previous studies (Bala& Kumai, 2015; Baxter & Cotter, 2009; Chandrasegaram et al., 2013; Hamdam et 
al., 2013; Mohamad et al., 2012) have found insignificant relationship between audit committee meeting 
and earnings quality. Based on these finding the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: Frequency of audit committee meeting is positively related to earnings quality. 
 
3.2 Audit Committee Expertiseand Earnings Quality. 
The audit committee oversees financial reporting and disclosure. Thus, audit committee member with 
accounting and finance background will aid in effective monitoring of management and the review of 
financial statements of a firm (Badolato et al., 2014) as well as in monitoring transfer pricing 
manipulations such as EM (Lo et al., 2010). When audit committee have members with requisite 
expertise in accounting and finance, the audit committee will be effective in monitoring and there will be 
good financial reporting. It will also limit opportunistic management and protect the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders thereby reducing agency problems and enhance earnings quality (Badolato 
et al., 2014; Marra et al., 2011). Several studies have found significant positive relationships between 
audit committee expertise and earnings quality (Badolato et al., 2014; Marra et al., 2011; Salleh et al., 
2007; Yusof, 2010). However, other past studies found insignificant relationships between audit 
committee expertise and earnings quality (Carcello et al., 2006; Hamdan et al., 2013; Lo et al., 2010).In 
view of the above submissions, the following hypothesis is postulated: 
 
H2: Audit committee expertise is positively related to earnings quality 
 
3.3 Audit Committee Meeting Attendance and Earnings Quality. 
Audit committee members’ meeting attendance is the percentage of audit committee members attending 
meetings in a year (Musa et al., 2017; Ormin et al., 2016). Ormin et al (2016) states that audit committee 
attendance to meeting is an evaluation of the performance of audit committee members. With more 
meeting attendance of audit committee members, there will be better monitoring of management 
activities especially in ensuring the integrity of financial statements (Vafeas, 1999). The presence of 
audit committee members is an important criterion in evaluating the performance of audit committees, 
because with the frequent presence of audit committee members, the audit committee is considered to be 
more effective (Ormin et al., 2016).  On the other hand, some studies found that positive relationship 
between audit committee meeting attendance and earnings quality such as the works of Musa et al. 
(2017) and Ormin et al. (2016). Based on the above scenario, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: Audit committee meeting attendance is positively related to earnings quality. 
 
4. Proposed Method 
It is recommended that future empirical studies could be conducted quantitatively with secondary data. 
The report from annual reports of companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) starting from the 
period of implementation of the new code on implementation guideline in 2013. It is further suggested 
that future empirical studies should target a sample of non-financial companies because these are the 




sectors that contributed significantly to domestic gross income in Indonesia. 
 
Table 1: Non-financial Companies Listed in IDX  
Sector Number of companies 
Agricultural sector 21 
Mining sector 28 
Basic and chemical sector 61 
Various industry sector 41 
Consumer goods industry sector 37 
Property, real estate and building construction sector 61 
Infrastructure, utilities and transport sector 57 
Trade, services and investment sector 121 
Total 427 
Observation periods (2013 to 2016 or four years) 4  
Firm-year observations   1,708 
Source: IDX (2016) 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework to test the effectiveness of audit committee through 
meetings, expertise and meeting attendance after the adoption of new codes of guidelines for the work of 
audit committees in Indonesia. It is expected that this study will increase the existing knowledge by 
measuring the effect of audit committee effectiveness through the aforementioned factors on earnings 
quality. In a nutshell, it expected that future empirical studies that adopted this model in Indonesia will 
provide a highlight on the impact of meetings, expertise and meeting attendance on earnings quality in 
Indonesian companies. Thus, understanding the effects of these three factors will provide a solution to 
overcome the earnings quality issues in Indonesia. 
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